Europe’s Rail Fails Military Mobility Test, Experts Warn at ERS Summit

Europe’s rail network is not prepared for the rapid movement of military equipment across borders. A debate at the ERS Summit 2026 showed that the main barriers are not tracks or technology, but fragmented rules and slow administration.

Representatives of wagon keepers, manufacturers, leasing companies and operators gathered in Warsaw on 16–17 March to discuss the future of European rail at the ERS Summit. One of the most notable parts of the programme was a panel discussion titled Interoperability in Military Mobility, moderated by Miroslav Haltuf. The discussion featured Michal Vítěz (ČD Cargo), Jean-Marc Bedmar (RB Rail AS) and Matthias Knuepling (GATX Rail Europe). The panel focused on whether today’s European rail network is capable of ensuring rapid cross-border movements of military equipment, materials and personnel.

Rail as the Backbone of Heavy Military Logistics

At the very beginning of the discussion, it was pointed out that military mobility is not only a matter of the army, but also of infrastructure, coordination and the ability of European states to cooperate. The panellists agreed that rail plays a key role in this regard, as it can transport heavy equipment, large volumes of material and dangerous goods more efficiently and safely than road transport.

Michal Vítěz from ČD Cargo summed it up: "From our perspective, rail is the best land-based solution for transporting such massive military equipment. This is due to its efficiency and transport capacity. We cannot imagine such volumes being moved solely by road."

Similarly, Jean-Marc Bedmar from Rail Baltica stated that the war in Ukraine has clearly shown that the importance of rail for military mobility in Eastern Europe cannot be underestimated. "It has become very clear that rail is essential for military mobility. Especially in difficult conditions, it has advantages over road transport that cannot be replaced," he said. According to him, rail is no longer a marginal topic in discussions about European security, but is once again becoming a backbone system without which large-scale logistics in crisis situations cannot realistically be ensured.

Main Barrier? Not Technology, but a Fragmented Europe

Although the panellists agreed on the strategic role of rail, they openly described the obstacles that currently hinder rapid cross-border movement. These include not only different track gauges in some parts of Europe, but also varying national rules, approval processes and signalling systems.

Vítěz pointed out that this reflects a long-standing issue of European interoperability: "We encounter fundamental barriers that are not limited to military mobility, but apply to rail in Europe in general. We can talk about different languages, driver certifications, signalling systems or traction. In the case of military transport, there is also the issue that the equipment is often oversized or too heavy, requiring prior approval from infrastructure managers."

Administration and the speed of decision-making were among the most prominent themes of the discussion. Knuepling noted that if, in a crisis, negotiations must take place separately with each infrastructure manager, Europe will lose before the transport even begins. According to him, there must be clear corridors, clear rules and an authority capable of enabling rapid action without unnecessary delays.

Bedmar added that the problem is not only technical barriers but also purely administrative delays. According to him, losing half a day due to transshipment caused by different track gauges may be a smaller issue than waiting several days at borders or delays caused by inconsistent procedures. In other words, Europe often loses time not on the tracks, but in paperwork.

Without Suitable Wagons, Military Transport Is Impossible

A very concrete part of the discussion focused on rolling stock. The panellists said that having infrastructure and political will is not sufficient if suitable wagons for transporting the heaviest military equipment are missing on the market.

Vítěz described this as one of the most practical current problems: "As operators, we have difficulty obtaining modern wagons for transporting heavy military equipment. These wagons exist on the market, but it is very difficult to create an economic model for their acquisition. Armies are often not ready to enter into long-term contracts, and these transports are irregular."

This opened a broader question of who should bear the cost of preparedness. While the European Union and individual states increasingly speak about defence investments, according to the panellists there is still a lack of systemic support in the rail part of the logistics chain. If a crisis situation arises, it will not be possible to wait two years for the production of new specialised wagons.

One Set of Rules, Not Two Systems

A strong conclusion of the panel was the discussion on whether Europe needs two interoperability regimes — one for peacetime and another for crisis situations. There was a relatively clear consensus: European rail needs one functional and understandable framework, not two separate systems.

Bedmar stated that unified rules are key to the agility of the entire network. If a main corridor fails, it must be possible to quickly use an alternative route without the system collapsing due to differing national requirements. Knuepling was even more direct: Europe has been speaking about a Single European Railway Area for years, but it still does not fully exist.

The discussion thus returned to a broader issue beyond military mobility. Many of the barriers that complicate potential military transport today also hinder everyday freight operations. This is why it was repeatedly said that measures strengthening military mobility could simultaneously benefit the entire European rail sector.

2030 as a Test of Europe’s Readiness

At the end of the discussion, panellists were asked what should change by 2030. The answers were factual but telling. All expressed the hope that, within four years, military mobility would be seen as a well-functioning part of the European rail system, rather than an urgent response to security threats.

"I hope that when we meet again in 2030, we will be able to say that times have improved and that we can once again focus primarily on business and peaceful cooperation," Knuepling concluded.

Bedmar added that even in more peaceful times, Europe must remain prepared. This reflects the core message of the Warsaw debate: military mobility is not a separate issue alongside the rail business. It is an extreme test of whether European rail truly functions as a connected, flexible and resilient system.

If Europe wants to withstand crisis situations, political declarations alone will not be enough. The discussion showed that it will require corridors, capacity, suitable rolling stock, simpler rules and faster decision-making.